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ABSTRACT 
According to our pricing framework block transaction premia depend on voting power being 
transferred through a block relative to voting power enjoyed by the market. Block transaction 
premia are shown to be correlated with both the block seller's and the block buyer's Shapley-
Shubik power indexes in a sample of Italian companies. This is consistent with the notion, first 
presented by Zwiebel (1995), that private benefits deriving from control of a company are 
divisible, and that the share of private benefits accruing to each shareholder is proportional to 
the probability of being pivotal in a controlling coalition. 
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1. Introduction 
 Shares of listed companies are usually traded in regulated, multilateral stock 
markets. However large blocks of shares often trade outside the stock market in bilateral 
negotiations. The price of a common share belonging to a block usually differs from the 
market price of a share. It has already been recognised that block transactions are often 
control transactions (Barclay and Holderness, 1991). Moreover, it is known that control 
could be sold at a price which differs from the market price of shares (Bebchuk, 1994) 
because controlling shareholders receive private benefits from control - i.e. non 
verifiable consumption and investment opportunities which are associated with 
discretion in allocating company resources. Yet we are not aware of pricing models for 
block transactions. This paper takes a preliminary step in this direction by highlighting 
the link between block premia and shareholders' voting power. 
 In our pricing framework, we exploit the fact that the value of a block is 
bounded below by the seller's valuation and above by the buyer's valuation. The seller 
(buyer)'s valuation is linked to the share of private benefits lost (acquired) with the 
block, which is in turn related to forgone (acquired) strategic importance. Similarly, the 
exchange price should be linked to the share of private benefits accruing to shareholders 
who trade in the marketplace, which is related to their strategic relevance. In pricing 
blocks we are therefore adapting Zwiebel's (1995) idea that private benefits from 
control are divisible and that the share accruing to a block investor depends on the 
strategic importance of the investor's block in forming controlling coalitions. 
 In order to assess the empirical relevance of this hypothesis, we compute voting 
power indexes for the block seller, the block buyer and for the market both before and 
after the transaction. Block premia are then related to voting power indexes in a cross 
section of listed Italian companies. Italy is an interesting case study since control blocks 
of listed companies often trade outside the stock market. Public companies, which are 
common in Anglo-Saxon countries and allow several control transactions to take place 
in the stock market through take-overs, are quite rare in Italy. On the contrary, family 
groups hold controlling interests through a pyramidal hierarchy of financial and 
operational companies. 
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 In this paper we do not estimate a structural model. The aim of our empirical 
part is instead to offer some stylised facts about the potential of Shapley values in 
pricing blocks, which - to our knowledge -  has never been done so far1. Shapley values 
were previously used by Andretta et al. (1990), Buzzacchi and Mosconi (1993), 
Rydquist (1987) and Zingales (1994, 1995) in order to price shares which are traded in 
the market. 
 Section 2 lays out a simple pricing model. In order to focus on ownership 
structure we deliberately ignore the impact of capital structure (Harris and Raviv, 1988), 
of market liquidity (Campbell, Grossman and Wang, 1993), of blockholders' skills 
(Barclay and Holderness, 1991) and of transaction type (Bebchuk, 1994) on block 
premia. Section 3 contains our empirical analysis. The first two subsections present our 
data and some descriptive statistics concerning block premia, block size and 
shareholders' power indexes before and after the transaction. Section 3.3 reports on 
correlation between block premia and shareholders' voting power. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Block Premium and Partial Benefits from Control 
 Zwiebel (1995) suggests that private benefits are divisible and that the share of 
private benefits accruing to a block investor depends on the strategic importance of the 
investor's block in forming controlling coalitions. According to this view, a moderate-
sized block in a firm owned by many disperse individuals confers large private benefits. 
On the contrary, a moderate-sized block investor receives no private benefits if one 
investor enjoys a majority position. Private benefits accruing to blockholder i are set 
equal to the share ϕi of total private benefits C, where ϕi is the Shapley value of agent i 
in a majority weighted game2. 
 In this paper we use the notion of partial private benefits in order to price voting 
shares in a stock market composed of both a bilateral block market and a multilateral 
market. The seller's valuation of his block Vs depends not only on forgone private 
                                                          
1  We refer the reader to Nicodano and Sembenelli (1996), where private benefits are related to firm 
financial structure. 
2  We refer the reader to Shapley and Shubik (1954) for its definition and to Gambarelli (1983) for some 
of its properties. We also refer to Gul (1989) and Owen (1982) for details on the game theoretic 
foundations of Shapley values. 
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benefits ϕsC but on forgone pecuniary benefits as well. Let q be the discounted cash 
flows generated by the company, NT be the number of shares in the block, Ns be the 
number of shares held after the transaction and N be the total number of shares in the 
company. Before selling his block, his pecuniary benefits equal ( )TS NNNq +  and the 
seller's valuation of his shares is: 
 
(1)   ( ).TSSS NNNqCV ++≡ ϕ  
 
 After the transaction, his valuation amounts to: 
 
(2)   V C q
N
NS S S' '≡ +ϕ  
 
where we assume that ϕ'S measures his new voting power and that both total private 
benefits and the expected stream of future profits are unaffected by the transaction. The 
seller's valuation of his block equals the difference between (1) and (2). The sum PNT 
received from the block sale cannot be lower than his valuation: 
 
(3)   ( ) .' TSST NN
qCPN +−≥ ϕϕ  
 
 By following a similar reasoning for the buyer we deduce the buyer's valuation 
of the block, which cannot be smaller than the amount paid for the block: 
 
(4)   ( ) ,' TbbT NN
qCPN +−≤ ϕϕ  
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where ϕb (ϕ'b) is the buyer's power index before (after) the transaction. The price of one 
share belonging to the block is therefore bounded below by the seller's valuation and 
above by the buyer's valuation: 
 
(5)   ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕS ST b bTN C
q
N
P
N
C q
N
− + ≤ ≤ − +' ' .  
 
 The market price of common shares, conditional on a block transaction, should 
similarly depend on the valuation of shares by those investors who trade in the market. 
It should therefore be equal to the present value of not only pecuniary benefits but 
private benefits as well. Indeed, it has already been suggested that private benefits are 
reflected in the exchange price of a common share in proportion to outsiders' Shapley 
value (Zingales, 1995). Let Pe be the market price of a common share, φ (φ') be 
outsiders' Shapley value before (after) the transaction and No the number of outsiders' 
shares No. Then the market price of a common share before the transaction is: 
 
(6)   P C
N
q
N
e
o
= +φ  0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 
 
and the pre-transaction block premium equals: 
 
(7)   .'' C
NN
PPPC
NN oT
bbe
o
T
SS 


 −−≤−≤


 −− φϕϕφϕϕ  
 
 A similar specification for the post-transaction premium obtains, with φ' (pe') 
replacing φ (pe). (6) implies that stock market price behaviour around block transactions 
should be associated with changes in the Shapley value of stockholders trading in the 
market, if φ' differs from φ. (7), in turn, states that block transaction premium is 
determined by the share of total private benefits being transferred through the block 
relative to the share of private benefits enjoyed by the market. In the empirical section 
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we present univariate correlations between the percentage premium on the one side and 
ϕS - ϕ'S, ϕ'b - ϕb and φ on the other, after a brief description of our dataset. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Data 
 Our sample consists of block transactions of listed companies which took place 
in Italy between 1987 and 1992. Most block prices, the name of the company, the 
number of shares in the block, the name of block traders come from Nomisma "Data on 
Mergers and Acquisitions". 
 The announcement date of the block transaction to the public and the missing 
data on block prices were retrieved through the business newspaper "Il Sole-24 Ore". 
Daily exchange prices were provided by Maurizio Murgia (Pavia University) for the 
time span which ranges from 120 days before to 120 days after the announcement. The 
distribution of shareholdings before and after the transaction is obtained primarily 
through "Taccuino dell'Azionista" directory, and complemented with "R&S" directory 
and the "Experimental Crossholdings Archive" edited by the Bank of Italy and 
CONSOB (the Italian SEC). In measuring voting shares we consolidated shareholdings 
which were controlled - through pyramidal groups - by the same shareholder. After 
merging these different datasets our original list of 545 transactions is reduced to 121 
observations. 
 In order to identify outsiders' share of common stock, we adopted the following 
procedure. After the top shareholders - together with the size of their holdings - had 
been identified, we set the market share equal to the difference between the total 
number of voting shares and the sum of top shareholders' holdings of voting shares. The 
Shapley-Shubik indexes for buyers, sellers and for the market were calculated using 
Gambarelli (1996) algorithm. 
 Italian Law requires a 50% majority for most corporate decisions, and 66% for 
others. It also offers special rights to certain minority stakes (10%, 20%...), which may 
then have bargaining power vis à vis the controlling shareholders. Therefore, we used 
different majority percentages such as (50%, 66%, 80%, 90%) in computing Shapley 
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values. Empirical regularities - which are reported below for the 50% majority rule - 
carry over to different majority rules with reduced statistical significance. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 portrays the distribution of the size of blocks, defined as NT/N, in our 
sample. It can be seen that more than 50% of our transactions concern small-sized 
blocks. Although a small-sized block transaction could in principle transfer large 
control benefits, we expected voting power transferred by small blocks to be small on 
average. Given the sample distribution of NT/N and the fact that 10% is the smallest 
share of votes conferring special rights in Italy, we partitioned our sample at a block 
size of 10%. In the subsample of blocks containing at least 10% of common shares 
(second column, Table 1) the incidence of majority transaction exceeds 25%. 
 In our simple framework of section 2 we overlooked the effect of stock market 
liquidity on stock market price and the premium. Yet liquidity effects are known to be 
relevant. We computed percentage block premia in Tables 2, 3 and 4 using averages of 
stock market prices, in order to wash away the effect of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks 
on market price. pe-1,-t  is the arithmetic average of stock market price from day -t to the 
day before the announcement, whereas pe1,t is the average of market prices from day 1 
to day t after the announcement. 
 Comparing across Tables 2 and 3 shows a median premium equal to 8.9% on the 
announcement day for the entire sample, which grows to 12.2% when only larger blocks 
are considered - consistent with the presumption that larger blocks transfer a larger 
share of private benefits. Both in the full sample and in the two subsamples the sample 
mean (26.2% for the full sample; 32.6% for larger blocks, 20% for smaller blocks) is 
greater than the median because the distribution is skewed due to a sizeable number of 
large premia. Also negative premia are present in the first quartile, and are larger - in 
absolute value - for the subsample containing smaller blocks (Table 4).  
 These negative premia cannot be ascribed - following equation (7) - to the fact 
that such blocks transferred less voting power than the voting power enjoyed by the 
market, as it is always possible for a seller to sell his (split-up) block in the market. One 
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possible explanation for negative premia which is consistent with equation (7) is 
negative private benefits arising from financial distress: the value of private benefits 
may turn negative (C<0) in insolvency because controlling shareholders loose 
reputation to stakeholders, and may be prosecuted by creditors. Another explanation for 
negative premia is associated with compensation for liquidity provision being asked by 
the block buyer. When there is a positive supply (demand) shock, traders buy (sell) at a 
discount (premium) for increased exposure to risk and adverse selection. This liquidity 
effect increases in the size of supply (demand) shock, for given risk aversion, profit 
variability and - in an anonymous market - incidence of insider trading (Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980). If a block, carrying negligible voting power, is offered for sale the price 
reduction requested by the buyer in order to take on more risk may dominate the voting 
premium, thus leading to negative premia. 
 Barclay and Holderness (1989) also encounter negative premia on the 
announcement day, which account for 20% of their sample. Their median premium 
(15.7%) is higher than ours. This divergence cannot be ascribed to their sample 
selection, comprising blocks of at least 5% of a firm's outstanding common stock, since 
our median premium is lower also for the subsample comprising blocks larger than 10% 
as well. On the contrary, their mean premium (20.4%) is lower than the one we find 
both in the full sample and for larger blocks. The fact that the distribution is more 
skewed in our sample is not surprising since ownership structures are less concentrated 
in the U.S. than in Italy. This in turn implies that a moderate sized block is more likely 
to be pivotal and consequently to command a premium in the U.S., whereas in Italy 
only relatively rare majority block transfers are associated with large transfers of private 
benefits. 
 A clear-cut feature of the distribution of block premia across time is its inverted 
bell shape. The (median) exchange price grows from day (-120) to the announcement 
day, then falls to a level which can be lower than the beginning one. This points to a 
positive temporary effect of block transactions on the exchange price. In our simple 
framework (7) this could be due to a temporary change in the market Shapley value φ.  
 Alternatively, excess demand for shares in the market before (the announcement 
of) large block transactions - which would cause market prices to increase - may be 
motivated by insider trading. Insider purchases should however be associated to value 
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increasing transactions, exerting a permanent change in the market price of shares 
which cannot be found in our data. Insider trading cannot therefore account for the 
inverted-bell shape of the premium around the block transaction. 
 When investors are heterogeneous only in their private investment opportunities 
and not in their information sets, stock prices may change following either new public 
information about future dividends, or changes in an investor's private investment 
opportunities. In the latter case, price grows (falls) to reflect the investor's need to buy 
(sell) and to attract trading counterparts. Since price changes without any expected 
change in future dividends, a return reversal is expected (Campbell et al., 1993). This 
explanation would fit our data, provided we could explain why private investment 
opportunities induce investors to buy in the market - rather than sell - before (the 
announcement of) block transactions. Purchases in advance of block transactions by 
block traders might be motivated by arbitrage when the market price of shares is lower 
than the block price. Yet the inverted bell shape is present also when blocks trade at a 
discount relative to market price. 
 The distribution of Shapley values across shareholder's types and time is 
portrayed in Tables 5 (full sample), 6 (size of blocks ≥ 0.10) and 7 (size of blocks 
<0.10). The sum of seller's, buyer's and market power indexes before (after) the 
transaction is lower than 1, on average, because there are other large shareholders who 
are not involved in the bilateral transaction, and do not belong to the market by 
construction. Sellers before the transaction have on average greater voting power (mean 
for full sample is .493) than buyers both before (.036) and after (.283) the transaction. 
Buyers after the purchase have in turn greater voting power than the market (.149 
before and .134 after the transaction) -  apart from the case of smaller blocks. 
 Table 5 reveals that the share of sellers' who are in control of the company is 
smaller than 50% but larger than 25%. This is true also when we restrict attention to 
smaller blocks3. Consistent with our expectation that larger blocks transfer larger voting 
power, the voting power differentials ϕS - ϕ'S and ϕ'b - ϕb grow when attention is 
restricted to larger blocks (Table 6). Table 6 confirms that more than 25% of larger 
block transactions are control transfers, and also shows that 25% of larger block 
                                                          
3 Approximately 54% (58%) of our sample is composed of companies which were controlled through 
the absolute majority of votes before (after) the transaction. 
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transactions do not transfer any voting power. For larger blocks, the seller's voting 
power index before the transaction is always close to the buyer's power index after the 
transaction. On the contrary, smaller blocks flow from relatively powerful sellers to 
buyers who are relatively powerless both before and after the purchase. 
3.3 Correlation Analysis 
 Table 8 portrays the correlation between the premium at various dates and the 
size of the block. When attention is focused on the full sample (first column) or on 
larger blocks (middle column) the correlation is positive and statistically significant. 
For smaller blocks, it turns insignificant. This is consistent with the idea that block 
premia have two component, one (non-negative) related to voting power being 
transferred, the other one (non-positive) related to compensation for liquidity provision 
by the block buyer. In larger blocks the first component, which grows with the size of 
the block4, dominates. In smaller blocks the second component, which also increases in 
absolute value in the size of the block but is negative, offsets the positive impact of the 
voting power component. 
 We now come to the predictions of our pricing framework (7):  
(i) a positive relation between ϕS - ϕ'S and/or ϕ'b - ϕb on the one side and the block 
premium on the other;  
(ii) a negative relation between φ (φ') and pre-transaction (post-transaction) 
premium. 
 Furthermore, even if it does not derive directly from our pricing model, it is 
reasonable to assume that: 
(iii)  (i) and (ii) are more likely to hold when larger block are traded. 
 Tables 9 (full sample) and 10 (subsample for larger blocks) show simple 
correlations between percentage block premia at various dates, and shareholders' 
Shapley values. Both ϕS - ϕ'S  and ϕ'b - ϕb are positively correlated with the premium, 
                                                          
4 In Burkart et al. (1996) block premium associated to control rents is decreasing in the size of the 
block. However, this behaviour applies to premia on controlling blocks which represent less than 50% 
of voting equity. These represent too small a share of our sample to be relevant in our correlation 
analysis. 
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and statistically significant. φ and φ' have the expected negative sign5, but are not 
statistically significant - possibly because of moderate cross sectional variation. When 
attention is restricted to smaller blocks (Table 11), voting power indexes loose 
explanatory power. This seems consistent with smaller blocks premia being affected, 
with equal strength, by the voting and the liquidity component. In this subsample we 
also detect an asymmetry between the buyer and the seller, which we are not able to 
rationalise. Indeed, while the sign of the seller's voting power is positive and marginally 
significant the buyer's is negative, even if not significant. 
4. Concluding Comments 
 Seller's and buyer's power index differentials are correlated with block premia in 
a sample of block transactions. Correlation coefficients are large, statistically 
significant, with the expected sign and stable over time for large block transactions, 
which are associated with the transfer of considerable voting power. 
 Block premia for smaller blocks, which in our sample transfer little voting 
power, are uncorrelated with Shapley values. Premia on smaller blocks are probably 
affected by market liquidity rather than private benefits, as suggested by the smaller 
correlation coefficients between block premia and block size.  
 Results concerning larger blocks are consistent with the view that private 
benefits deriving from control of a company are divisible, and that the share of private 
benefits accruing to each shareholder is proportional to the probability of being pivotal 
in a controlling coalition. It also confirms that voting power differentials can provide 
help in pricing blocks. Further progress in this area requires abandoning the assumption 
that private benefits are unrelated to capital structure - a step which is in our research 
agenda. 
REFERENCES 
Andretta M., F. Brioschi, and L. Buzzacchi (1990), Azioni di Risparmio ed Azioni 
Ordinarie: un Modello di Valutazione Relativa, Finanza, Imprese e Mercati, 2, 89-
108. 
Barclay M.J., and C. Holderness (1989), Private Benefits from Control of Public 
Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 371-395. 
                                                          
5 Outsiders' power index is likely to have been overestimated due to our assumption of co-ordinated 
behaviour. Yet the sign of our correlation coefficient do not seem to suffer - possibility because the 
cross sectional distribution of φ is not significantly altered by this measurement problem. 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 17/1996 
 
 
12
Barclay M.J., and C. Holderness (1991), Negotiated Block Trades and Corporate 
Control,  Journal of Finance, 56, 861-878. 
Buzzacchi L., and R. Mosconi (1993), Azioni di Risparmio e Valore del Controllo: 
Alcune Evidenze Empiriche, Centro "P. Baffi" Working Paper Series, 73. 
Bebchuk L.A. (1994), Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 109, 957-994. 
Burkart M., D. Grombe, and F. Panunzi (1996), Block Premia in Transfers of Corporate 
Control, Mimeo. 
Campbell, J.Y., S. Grossman, and J. Wang (1993), Trading Volume and Serial 
Correlation in Stock Returns, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 905-939. 
Gambarelli G. (1996), Takeover Algorithms, in. M. Bertocchi, E. Cavalli, S.Komolsi 
eds., Modelling Techniques for Financial Markets and Bank Management, Physika 
Verlag, Heidelberg, 212-222. 
Gambarelli G. (1983), Common Behavior of Power Indices, International Journal of 
Game Theory, 12,  237- 244. 
Grossman S.J., and J.E. Stiglitz (1980), On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, American Economic Review, 70, 393-408. 
Gul F. (1989), Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value, Econometrica, 57, 81-95. 
Harris M., and A. Raviv (1988), Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 55-86. 
Holthausen R., R. Leftwich, and D. Mayers (1987), The Effect of Large Block 
Transactions on Security Prices: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 19, 237-268. 
Nicodano G., and A. Sembenelli (1996), Block Transaction Premia and Private 
Benefits. An Empirical Investigation, Centro "P. Baffi" Working Paper Series, 
Forthcoming. 
Owen G. (1982), Game Theory, Academic Press, Orlando. 
Rydquist K. (1987), The Pricing of Shares with Different Voting Power and the Theory 
of Oceanic Games, The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of 
Economics, Stockholm. 
Shapley L.S,. and M. Shubik (1954), A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of 
Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review, 48,  787-792. 
Zingales L. (1994), The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock 
Exchange Experience, The Review of Financial Studies, 7, 125-148. 
Zingales L. (1995), What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 110, 1047-1073. 
Zwiebel J. (1995), Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control, Review 
of Economic Studies, 62, 161-185. 





WORKING  PAPER  SERIES (1996-1993) 
1996 
1/96 Aspetti e misure della produttività. Un'analisi statistica su tre aziende elettriche europee, by Donatella 
Cangialosi, February 
2/96 L'analisi e la valutazione della soddisfazione degli utenti interni: un'applicazione nell'ambito dei servizi sanitari, 
by Maria Teresa Morana, February 
3/96 La funzione di costo nel servizio idrico. Un contributo al dibattito sul metodo normalizzato per la 
determinazione della tariffa del servizio idrico integrato, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Paola Fabbri, February 
4/96 Coerenza d'impresa e diversificazione settoriale: un'applicazione alle società leaders nell'industria 
manifatturiera europea, by Marco Orecchia, February 
5/96 Privatizzazioni: meccanismi di collocamento e assetti proprietari. Il caso STET, by Paola Fabbri, February 
6/96 I nuovi scenari competitivi  nell'industria delle telecomunicazioni: le principali esperienze internazionali, by 
Paola Fabbri, February 
7/96 Accordi, joint-venture e investimenti diretti dell'industria italiana nella CSI: Un'analisi qualitativa, by Chiara 
Monti and Giampaolo Vitali, February 
8/96 Verso la riconversione di settori utilizzatori di amianto.  Risultati di un'indagine sul campo, by Marisa Gerbi 
Sethi, Salvatore Marino  and Maria Zittino, February 
9/96 Innovazione tecnologica e competitività internazionale: quale futuro per i distretti e le economie locali, by 
Secondo Rolfo, March 
10/96 Dati disaggregati e analisi della struttura industriale: la matrice europea delle quote di mercato, by Laura 
Rondi, March 
11/96 Le decisioni di entrata e di uscita: evidenze empiriche sui maggiori gruppi italiani, by Alessandro Sembenelli 
and Davide Vannoni, April 
12/96 Le direttrici della diversificazione nella grande industria italiana, by Davide Vannoni, April 
13/96 R&S cooperativa e non-cooperativa in un duopolio misto con spillovers, by Marco Orecchia, May 
14/96 Unità di studio sulle strategie di crescita esterna delle imprese italiane, by Giampaolo Vitali and Maria Zittino, 
July. Not available 
15/96 Uno strumento di politica per l'innovazione: la prospezione tecnologica, by Secondo Rolfo, September 
16/96 L'introduzione della Qualità Totale in aziende ospedaliere: aspettative ed opinioni del middle management, by 
Gian Franco Corio, September 
17/96 Shareholders’ voting power and block transaction premia: an empirical analysis of Italian listed companies, by 
Giovanna Nicodano and Alessandro Sembenelli, November 
18/96 La valutazione dell'impatto delle politiche tecnologiche: un'analisi classificatoria e una rassegna di alcune 
esperienze europee, by Domiziano Boschi, November 
19/96 L'industria orafa italiana: lo sviluppo del settore punta sulle esportazioni, by Anna Maria Gaibisso and Elena 
Ragazzi, November 
20/96 La centralità dell'innovazione nell'intervento pubblico nazionale e regionale in Germania, by Secondo Rolfo, 
December 
21/96 Ricerca, innovazione e mercato: la nuova politica del Regno Unito, by Secondo Rolfo, December 
22/96 Politiche per l'innovazione in Francia, by Elena Ragazzi, December 
23/96 La relazione tra struttura finanziaria e decisioni reali delle imprese: una rassegna critica dell'evidenza 
empirica, by Anna Bottasso, December 
 
 
1995 
1/95 Form of ownership and financial constraints: panel data evidence on leverage and investment  choices by Italian 
firms, by Fabio Schiantarelli and Alessandro Sembenelli, March 
2/95 Regulation of the electric supply industry in Italy, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Elena Ragazzi, March 
3/95 Restructuring product development and production networks: Fiat Auto, by Giuseppe Calabrese, September 
4/95 Explaining corporate structure: the MD matrix, product differentiation and size of market, by Stephen Davies, 
Laura Rondi and Alessandro Sembenelli, November 
5/95 Regulation and total productivity performance in electricity: a comparison  between Italy, Germany and France, 
by Giovanni Fraquelli and Davide Vannoni, December 
6/95 Strategie di crescita esterna nel sistema bancario italiano: un'analisi empirica 1987-1994, by Stefano Olivero 
and Giampaolo Vitali, December 
7/95 Panel Ceris su dati di impresa: aspetti metodologici e istruzioni per l'uso, by Diego Margon, Alessandro 
Sembenelli and Davide Vannoni, December 
 
 
 
1994 
1/94 Una politica industriale per gli investimenti esteri in Italia: alcune riflessioni, by Giampaolo Vitali, May 
2/94 Scelte cooperative in attività di ricerca e sviluppo, by Marco Orecchia, May 
3/94 Perché le matrici intersettoriali per misurare l'integrazione verticale?, by Davide Vannoni, July 
4/94 Fiat Auto: A simultaneous engineering experience, by Giuseppe Calabrese, August 
 
 
1993 
1/93 Spanish machine tool industry, by Giuseppe Calabrese, November 
2/93 The machine tool industry in Japan, by Giampaolo Vitali, November 
3/93 The UK machine tool industry,  by Alessandro Sembenelli  and Paul Simpson, November 
4/93 The Italian  machine tool industry, by Secondo Rolfo, November 
5/93 Firms' financial and real responses to business cycle shocks and monetary tightening: evidence for large and 
small Italian companies, by Laura Rondi, Brian Sack, Fabio Schiantarelli and Alessandro Sembenelli, 
December 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Free copies are distributed on request to Universities, Research Institutes, researchers, students, etc. 
Please, write to:    
MARIA ZITTINO 
Working Papers Coordinator 
CERIS-CNR 
Via Real Collegio, 30; 10024 Moncalieri (Torino), Italy 
Tel.  +39 011 6824.914;     Fax  +39 011 6824.966;  m.zittino@ceris.cnr.it; http://www.ceris.cnr.it 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2000  by CNR-Ceris 
All rights reserved. Parts of this paper may be reproduced with the permission of the author(s) and quoting the authors 
and CNR-Ceris 
 
